The objective of this work was to review the complementary activities of the cash transfer programme using a gender approach and to formulate recommendations on how to structure these activities so that they better meet the needs of women and young girls.

The report follows an initial review of the core cash transfer module, which analysed the various risks and vulnerabilities that women and girls face in the context of Burundi, and which assessed the extent to which the cash transfer programme addressed these.

The purpose of this technical support is to assess the extent to which the cash plus programme is gender-responsive, and to provide recommendations for strategically advancing cash plus activities to achieve better results for girls and women in the project coverage areas.

This report focuses on the analysis of ‘gender’ indicators as part of the activities of the MERANKABANDI project. In particular, the study examined the extent to which the MERANKABANDI project was formulated according to a gender approach aimed at equality and equity. This study is based on an analysis of the context in Burundi, the different risks and vulnerabilities that affect women and girls, it identifies the challenges associated with the activities from a gender perspective, and proposes recommendations for the effective inclusion of gender in the implementation of the project activities.

However, experience of cash transfers in developing countries, including post-conflict contexts, indicates that these can help promote social cohesion but can also undermine it by creating divisions between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Targeting is a critical factor in determining impact.

Universal basic income (UBI) schemes (universal, unconditional transfers) are being tried in a number of largely developed countries. Evidence from those and pilot schemes in developing countries suggests that UBI could promote social cohesion.

Risks in relation to cash transfer programmes include diversion or theft of funds, corruption in the selection of beneficiaries and in transfer of cash, collusion in corruption by aid agency staff and/or money transfer staff, fraud, and security risks to staff and beneficiaries. There is also the risk that beneficiaries will misuse the cash, wasting it on ‘vice goods’ such as alcohol and drugs. And that cash transfers could have inflationary effects on local markets, pushing up prices of key goods. Overall, the literature finds that the risks associated with cash transfers are no greater than those associated with in-kind assistance, and they can be used effectively in fragile contexts: ‘Cash transfers have been used in fragile and conflict-affected states and to date there is not evidence that this results in large-scale diversion of aid or that cash is more prone to diversion than in-kind aid’ (Gordon, 2015: 3).

Cash transfer programmes, like most social protection programmes, are vulnerable to fraud, errors,
corruption and misuse of funds, which undermine their achievements (Perron, 2012: 1; Bhargava and Raha, 2015: vi). Effective mechanisms for transparency, accountability and participation help minimise those in need being wrongfully excluded from programme rolls; discourages clientelism and abuse of programmes for political and private gain by state actors; contributes to programme credibility; and enables programmes to more effectively serve their intended beneficiaries (Gamba, 2016: 5; Bassett and Blanco, 2011: 1).

Latin American countries developed two types of citizen oversight mechanisms for cash transfer programmes: individual and collective mechanisms, as a way of protecting the cash transfer programmes from corruption and votecatching behaviour (Eng and Perron, 2013: 8). Collective mechanisms bring together civil society, in particular beneficiaries, with public sector representatives to ‘monitor that there are no mistakes in terms of inclusion and exclusion of beneficiaries, guarantee that the programme functions according to its initial objectives, and monitor that the cash transfers are not captured by elites or political interests, nor affected by corruption or votecatching behaviour’ (Eng and Perron, 2013: 8). However, many cash transfer programme accountability mechanisms seem to favour individual approaches rather than collective action, which can result in individual beneficiaries being less able to combat abuses of power (Hevia de la Jara, 2008; Hevia, 2010; Jones and Shaheen, 2012).

Expert contributors agree that humanitarian cash transfers by their nature tend to be part of short-term programmes which are not evaluated beyond the life of the programme. Most of the evidence on different transfer modality focuses on the short-term. Cash tends to be favoured over food by recipients, it is generally more cost effective and has the potential to be invested for longer-term resilience. A UNICEF evaluation which assessed impacts of a cash transfer programme one-year on found benefits were not sustained for the most marginalised (Erba, forthcoming). Combining emergency assistance with longer-term social protection is a useful way forward. Programmes which provide transfers with other mechanisms for support with regards to future employment and investment have seen some success.

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